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What Works Is Work: Welfare Reform and
Poverty Reduction
Ron Haskins∗
¶1

This is an essay about how the 1996 welfare reform law and other policies
contributed to the sharpest decline in child poverty since the early 1970s. The story is
told in the context of the nation’s long struggle to reduce poverty and the factors that
have made it so difficult to make progress against poverty. These factors involve both
forces over which individuals have little or no control and factors over which they have
almost complete control. To a large extent, the achievement of welfare reform was to use
both positive and negative incentives—carrots and sticks. The sticks encourage, cajole,
or force able-bodied mothers to exploit the factors over which they have control and enter
the labor force. The carrots reinforce their initiative with government-provided benefits
that support poor and low-income workers. I argue that this combination of carrots and
sticks is the most successful strategy for reducing child poverty that the government has
yet devised. The strategy enjoys solid support from taxpayers, which suggests that
innovative expansions that further increase personal responsibility, increase income, and
reduce poverty would receive public support. Unfortunately, there are clear downsides to
the new policies, raising the issue of whether creating outcomes that include increased
work, increased income, and reduced poverty for many offset the decline into deep
poverty of a few.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Figure 1
Poverty Rate, 1959-2006
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Poverty Tables, Table 2, "Poverty Status
of People by Family Relationship, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1959-2005."
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Consider the surprising lack of progress against poverty in the last half-century or
so.1 Figure 1 shows that poverty fell precipitously during the 1960s, rose slightly for a
few years, and then fell to its lowest level ever, a little over eleven percent, in 1973 and
1974. Over the next three decades and more, poverty moved up and down in rough
correlation with the economy, but never again approached the low achieved in the mid1970s.

1

The official poverty measure in the United States suffers from numerous flaws. It is based on the cost of
food in the 1950s and is adjusted only for family size and inflation. Flaws include the failure to consider
regional differences or rural/urban differences in the cost of living, the failure to include many types of
income from government benefits, and the failure to consider work-related costs such as child care and
transportation. The National Academies, based on the work of an expert task force, published a thorough
review of these and other problems and issued specific recommendations for revising the poverty measure.
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEASURING POVERTY: A NEW APPROACH 25–69 (Robert T. Michael
& Constance F. Citro eds., 1995). Although there has been abundant discussion in Washington, D.C. of
changing the official poverty measure, so far it has not been changed. The level of poverty in any given
year may be misleading because the official definition is flawed, but poverty trends (like those discussed
here) are more or less unaffected because a common definition has been followed over the years. For the
official definition of poverty and several other possible definitions, see generally id. See also Rebecca
Blank, Presidential Address: How to Improve Poverty Measurement in the United States, 27 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 233, 233–54 (2008); U.S. Census Bureau, How the Census Bureau Measures Poverty,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/povdef.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2009).
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Figure 2
Federal and State Spending on Means-Tested Programs, 1968-2004
700

583

Total Spending (billions of 2004 dollars)

600

500

400

300

200

100
89

Source: Congressional Research Service, Cash and Noncash Benefits for Persons with
Limited Income, RL33340, March 27, 2006.
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This lack of progress is especially surprising in view of the tsunami of government
means-tested programs and the blizzard of spending on these programs (Figure 2). As
the breadth of these programs expanded—eventually to include cash, medical, nutrition,
housing, social services, and other categories of programs—and spending grew as
measured in constant dollars, as a percentage of all federal spending, and as a percentage
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the nation made no progress against poverty.2 If
anything, there was a slight increase in poverty between the early 1970s and 2006. Why?

2

Since 1968, federal spending on means-tested programs has increased from 6% to nearly 19% of total
federal outlays and from less than 1.2% to nearly 3.6% of GDP. Author’s calculations based on VEE
BURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CASH AND NONCASH BENEFITS FOR PERSONS WITH LIMITED INCOME:
ELIGIBILITY RULES, RECIPIENT AND EXPENDITURE DATA, FY2002-FY2004 (2006).
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A. Changing Family Composition
Figure 3
Percent of Children Living in Single-Parent Families, 1960-2006
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, at
www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/ch1.xls.
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It is by now old news that the American family has undergone profound changes in
recent decades. Marriage rates fell while divorce rates increased to a high level in the
early 1980s and have remained high since.3 Non-marital birth rates continue to grow
beyond all previous experience as cohabitation continues to increase.4 The upshot is that
at any given moment nearly thirty percent of American children live in a single-parent
family, and over the course of their childhood far more spend some time in a singleparent family (Figure 3).5 These discouraging figures are even worse in the case of
minorities, especially black Americans. About seventy percent of black children are born
into a single-parent family6 and around half of the rest experience a divorce.7 Thus,
approximately eighty percent of black children spend at least part of their childhood
living outside the context of a married-couple family.8
3

See David Elwood & Christopher Jenks, The Spread of Single-Parent Families in the United States Since
1960, in THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY 25, 30 (Daniel P. Moynihan, Timothy M. Smeeding & Lee
Rainwater eds., 2006).
4
Id. at 33–35.
5
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Living Arrangements of Children Under 18 Years Old: 1960 to Present, in
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY TABLE CH-1 (2008), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/ch1.xls.
6
NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., BIRTHS: FINAL DATA
FOR 2004, 61 tbl. 20, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr55/nvsr55_01.pdf.
7
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Survey of Income and Program Participation, Table 3: Marital History for
People 15 Years and Over, by Age and Sex, for Black Alone: 2004, available at
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/marital-hist/2004/tab3-blackalone.xls.
8
If around seventy percent of black children are born outside marriage and about half of the remainder
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Figure 4
Poverty in Female-Headed and Married-Couple Families with Children, 1974-2006
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Poverty Tables, Table 4, “Poverty Status of
Families, by Type of Family, Presence of Related Children, Race, and Hispanic Origin,"
at www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/histpov/hstpov4.html.
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Figure 4 shows one reason why scholars and policymakers should be concerned
about the growing number of children in single-parent families. In most years, poverty
rates are four or five times as high in female-headed families as in married-couple
families. It follows that as the fraction of children living in female-headed families rises
(see Figure 3), all else being equal, so does the poverty rate for children. Given the
disparity in poverty rates between these family types, it is little wonder that research
suggests that an increase of children in married-coupled families would produce a fall in
the poverty rate.9 In addition, there could well be a long-term impact on poverty because
children reared by their married parents do better in school, are less likely to have mental
health problems, are less likely to be arrested, and are more likely to go to college than
children reared by single parents.10 In any case, until the rate of children living with their
married parents increases, the high and still increasing share of children living with single
parents will continue to push the poverty rate upwards.

experience a divorce, it would at first seem to follow that about eighty-five percent of black children spend
some time in a single-parent family. However, around half of the children born outside marriage are born
to couples that cohabit and some of these couples stay together and eventually marry.
9
See Robert I. Lerman, The Impact of the Changing US Family Structure on Child Poverty and Income
Inequality, 63 ECONOMICA S119, S127–37 (1996); Adam Thomas & Isabel Sawhill, For Richer or for
Poorer: Marriage as an Antipoverty Strategy, 21 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 587, 594–97 (2002).
10
See generally Sara McLanahan, Elisabeth Donahue & Ron Haskins, Introducing the Issue, FUTURE OF
CHILD., Fall 2005, at 3, 10, available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/usr_doc/01_foc_152_fall05_intro.pdf (arguing that marriage is “the most effective family structure in which to raise
children”).
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B. Changes in Work and Wages
Figure 5
Employment-to-Population Ratios for 16-24 Year-Old
Black Males and Females and Never-Married Mothers, 1965-2005
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Source: Calculations by Gary Burtless and Emily Roessel of the
Brookings Institution using data from the Current Population Survey.
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Work rates for males have declined in recent years in several nations with advanced
economies.11 This decline has been especially acute in the United States among young
black males. Figure 5 shows labor force participation rates for young black males, black
females, and never-married mothers of all races (but disproportionately black). Black
male work rates started at the remarkably low level of slightly over fifty percent in the
mid-1960s, declined precipitously in the early and mid-1970s, held steady until the early
2000s, and then fell again, ending the period with a work rate that had declined by nearly
one-third since the mid-1960s.
There may well be a connection between the precipitous fall in male work rates,
especially for young minority males, and the falling rate of marriage for young blacks.
There is considerable evidence that a major qualification that females look for in a mate
is employment and earnings. Poor women may be willing to cohabit with their
boyfriends and even to have babies with them without any intention of marrying them
because, among other factors, they are unemployed or work only sporadically.12
Nonworking males contribute to child poverty by having babies outside marriage, by not

11

ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK: BOOSTING JOBS AND INCOMES 267
(2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/15/36900060.pdf.
12
Based on interviews with 162 inner-city black, white, and Puerto Rican mothers, Edin and Kefalas
emphasize the importance of economic factors in the mothers’ thinking about males they would agree to
marry. KATHY EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD
BEFORE MARRIAGE 71–80, 201–04 (2005).
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forming married-parent families, and by failing to provide support for their children when
they live apart.
Figure 6
Trend in Real Hourly Wages at 10th, 50th, and 95th Percentiles, 1979-2005
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Source: Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein, Sylvia Allegretto, The State of Working America
2006-2007 (Economic Policy Institute 2007).
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Nonwork is certainly an important reason for the lack of progress against poverty,
but another part of the story involves problems with the low-wage labor market. Despite
increases in the share of males and females of all ethnic groups completing high school
since the 1960s, lack of education and skills at the bottom of the income distribution is
still an important problem. Jobs that pay good wages usually require skills and
experience, often based in part on education and training. But many young people—
again especially black males—drop out of high school. Many more of all ethnic groups
go no further than high school.13 Furthermore, international trade, growing sophistication
of business technologies, immigration of low-skilled workers, and the availability of
cheap labor abroad have conspired to make wages more or less stagnant at the bottom of
the U.S. wage distribution.
Figure 6 shows the trends in wages at the tenth, fiftieth, and ninety-fifth percentiles
of the wage distribution from 1979 to 2005. To more clearly depict these trends, wages
are expressed in proportion to wages in 1979. The story portrayed in Figure 6 is quickly
told: wages at the bottom, after falling and then rising, are only a little above where they
were nearly three decades ago; wages in the middle have increased somewhat (around
0.3% per year); and wages at the top have increased by nearly 40%. During this period,
the American economy was the envy of the world because it generated so many jobs,
13

For an excellent overview of trends in both high school and college graduation rates, see generally
CLAUDE S. FISCHER & MICHAEL HOUT, CENTURY OF DIFFERENCE: HOW AMERICA CHANGED IN THE LAST
ONE HUNDRED YEARS (2006).
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grew by nearly three percent per year on average, and greatly increased the average
wealth of most Americans.14 Yet wages at the bottom have hardly improved. The only
time the bottom of the wage distribution rose was during the tight labor market of the
second half of the 1990s. But in most years for the past quarter century, wages at the
bottom fell or were stagnant. If the American economy provided steady increases in
wages at the bottom, workers receiving those wages would have a better chance to rise
above poverty. But unfortunately, the job market at the bottom turns out to be another
force pushing poverty up.
C. Stagnant Levels of Education
Figure 7
Median Family Income for Heads of Household with
Various Levels of Educational Achievement, 1964-2005
100,000

Professional or graduate degree
4 year college degree

90,000

High school degree but not a 4 year college degree
Median Family Income (2004 dollars)

80,000

Less than high school (dropout)

70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000

Source: Julia Isaacs, Isabel Sawhill, and Ron Haskins, Getting Ahead or Losing Ground:
Economic Mobility in America (Pew Charitable Trusts 2008).
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The American economy rewards those with more education, and the rewards have
been growing in recent decades. Figure 7 portrays the differences in returns on schooling
for those who have achieved various levels of educational credentials. Three points are
apparent. First, there has consistently been a major difference in the income between
those with higher and lower educational credentials. Second, this difference has been
increasing for more than three decades. By 2005, there were major and increasing
differences in income between those with professional or graduate degrees and those who
14

See Ron Haskins, Wealth and Economic Mobility, in GETTING AHEAD OR LOSING GROUND: ECONOMIC
MOBILITY IN AMERICA 47, 48 (Julia B. Isaacs, Isabel V. Sawhill & Ron Haskins, eds, 2008), available at
http://www.economicmobility.org/assets/pdfs/Economic_Mobility_in_America_Full.pdf; see also ROBERT
I. LERMAN, THE URBAN INST., HAVE MIDDLE INCOME PARENTS IMPROVED THEIR ECONOMIC STATUS?
(2007), available at http://www.urban.org/publications/311424.html (finding that all middle-income
parents saw an increase in income, but only married parents had an increase in net worth).
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held bachelors degrees. Those with bachelors degrees did much better than those with
high school degrees, and those with high school degrees did better than dropouts. Third,
the returns on achieving either a BA or a professional or graduate degree have been
increasing for thirty years, while the returns on a high school degree or no degree have
been declining or flat. In large part because of the wage story, high school dropouts now,
and in the future, will have trouble rising above poverty, as will many with only high
school diplomas.
¶11
Although people of both genders and all ethnic groups dramatically increased their
levels of educational attainment over the course of the twentieth century, the rate of
increase of high school completion has slowed considerably.15 Equally important,
children’s learning of basic skills has been virtually flat over the past quarter century in
both reading and math.16 Further, at least forty percent of Americans receive no
education beyond high school, and the rate of college completion is strikingly lower
among minorities and children from low-income families.17 Education levels and
educational achievement, especially for those in the bottom half of the distribution, are
stagnant, thereby contributing to the difficulty of reducing poverty.
D. Immigration
¶12

Another factor that puts upward pressure on U.S. poverty rates is immigration.
Each year around 1.5 million immigrants enter the United States, about one-third of them
illegally.18 Recent immigrants to the United States fall into a bi-modal distribution.
Many are highly educated and tend to do well in the U.S. labor market by getting good
jobs with high wages. By contrast, many immigrants are high school dropouts and have
only their labor to contribute to the American economy.19 The poverty rate among
immigrants is 15.2%, nearly 30% above that of non-immigrants.20 If the immigrant
poverty rate is higher than the rate for non-immigrants, it is a mathematical certainty that
immigrants increase the overall poverty rate. A reasonable estimate is that in 2005,
immigrants increased the poverty rate by about one percentage point.21 Further,
immigrant children make up about twenty-two percent of U.S. children, because many

15

CLAUDE S. FISCHER & MICHAEL HOUT, CENTURY OF DIFFERENCE: HOW AMERICA CHANGED IN THE
LAST ONE HUNDRED YEARS 12–18 (2006).
16
See National Center for Educational Statistics, U.S. Department of Education, Tables and Figures,
http://nces.ed.gov/quicktables/index.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2009).
17
Id.
18
For an overview of the trends in immigration to the United States between 1960 and 2005, see Philip
Martin & Elizabeth Midgley, Immigration: Shaping and Reshaping America, POPULATION BULLETIN, Dec.
2006, at 1, 5, available at http://www.prb.org/pdf06/61.4USMigration.pdf. For information about illegal
immigration, see JEFFREY S. PASSEL, THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT
POPULATION IN THE U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH 2005 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (2006).
19
Ron Haskins, Immigration: Wages, Education, and Mobility in GETTING AHEAD OR LOSING GROUND:
ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN AMERICA 81, 82 (Julia B. Isaacs, Isabel V. Sawhill & Ron Haskins, eds., 2008),
available at http://www.economicmobility.org/assets/pdfs/EMP_Immigrants_ChapterVII.pdf [hereinafter
Haskins, Immigration: Wages, Education, and Mobility].
20
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, People in Poverty by Nativity: 1993 to 2006, in CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY
HISTORICAL POVERTY TABLES: TABLE 23 (2008), available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/histpov/hstpov23.xls.
21
Author’s calculations based on id.
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immigrants are in their prime child-bearing years.22 Thus, the impact of immigrants on
the child poverty rate is somewhat greater than their impact on the overall poverty rate.
Figure 8
Percentage Wage Difference of First and Second
Generation Workers Relative to Native-Born Workers, 1940-2000
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Source: George Borjas, Making It in America: Social Mobility in the Immigrant
Population , Future of Children, Fall 2006, at 59.
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A major reason for excess poverty among immigrants is that they command low
wages relative to American workers (Figure 8). Comparing the age-adjusted wages of
first-generation immigrants with the wages of non-immigrants in 1940, 1970, and 2000,
George Borjas of Harvard showed a substantial decline of immigrant wages, from 5.8%
above average non-immigrant wages in 1940, falling to only 1.4% above in 1970, and
then falling still further to 19.7% below the average wages of native-born citizens in
2000.23 The reason for this decline in relative wages of immigrants is that rapidly
increasing shares of immigrants come from poor countries, such as Mexico, and have
relatively low levels of education.24 Nor is the problem of low relative wages confined to
the first generation. If immigrants from a given region, such as Latin America, have
22

RANDY CAPPS, MICHAEL FIX, JASON OST, JANE REARDON-ANDERSON & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, THE URBAN
INST., THE HEALTH AND WELL-BEING OF YOUNG CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS 5 (2004).
23
George J. Borjas, Making It in America: Social Mobility in the Immigrant Population, FUTURE OF
CHILD., Fall 2006, at 55, 59, available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/usr_doc/04_5563_borjas.pdf; see
also Haskins, Immigration: Wages, Education, and Mobility, supra note 19, at 81 (reviewing the labor
market experiences of immigrants over the last several decades and showing that the average education and
wages of each new generation have been falling and that these relatively low wages persist into the second
generation).
24
See generally Mark R. Rosenzweig, Global Wage Differences and International Student Flows, in
BROOKINGS TRADE FORUM 57 (Susan M. Collins & Carol Graham, eds., 2006) (examining educational
levels of foreign-born students in the United States).
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relative wages below average, their children will have higher relative wages because they
will move closer to the mean of non-immigrant wages. Even so, as can be seen by in
Figure 8, second generation immigrant relative wages fell from 14.6% above the nonimmigrant average in 1970 to only 6.3% above average in 2000. If this pattern of
declining relative wages continues into the future, the 2000 cohort of children immigrants
will have wages that are below those of non-immigrant workers when they reach their
prime earning years in the 2030s. Declining relative wages in both the first and second
generation promise to continue the current trend of immigrants putting upward pressure
on the U.S. poverty rate.
E. Summary
¶14

The deck is stacked against scholars, administrators, and policymakers who want to
figure out ways to reduce poverty in America—not to mention families that want to
escape from or avoid poverty. An increasing share of children live in the family type that
has the highest poverty rate, males have trended toward non-work, wages at the bottom of
the distribution have been stagnant, too many young people drop out of school and fail to
achieve strong math and literacy skills, and millions of low-skilled immigrants have
placed downward pressure on wages at the bottom of the wage distribution, especially in
some regions of the country. But nevermind the stacked deck. Policymakers, with help
from scholars, have figured out a strategy for increasing income and reducing poverty
among the most poverty-ridden group in our society—single females with children.
II. A SUCCESSFUL PLAN TO REDUCE POVERTY
A. Background of the 1996 Reforms

¶15

A key part of this anti-poverty strategy is the 1996 welfare reform law and, in
particular, its work requirements. The context of the 1996 law was the failure of the
strategy of simply giving money and in-kind benefits to the poor to reduce poverty.
President Johnson, who declared the War on Poverty in 1964, said that his strategy was to
provide “a hand up, not a hand out.”25 Even so, research by David Ellwood and Mary Jo
Bane at Harvard in the mid-1980s showed that the strategy of unencumbered giving led
to many very long stays on the nation’s major cash welfare program, Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC). Of the families on the rolls at any given moment, sixtyfive percent would eventually be on cash welfare for eight years or more (counting repeat
spells).26
¶16
As Congress began to wake up to the problem of welfare dependency, at least five
streams merged to create a mighty river for reform.27 The first was that the public did not
like the federal strategy of supporting people on welfare for extended periods. The public
wanted able-bodied people on welfare to work and leave welfare.28 Although usually
dormant as a political force, this preference of the public for work over welfare could be
25

MICHAEL L. GILLETTE, LAUNCHING THE WAR ON POVERTY: AN ORAL HISTORY, at xiv–xv (1996).
Mary Jo Bane & David T. Ellwood, Slipping into and out of Poverty: The Dynamics of Spells, 21 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 1, 12, 18, 21 (1986).
27
This account of the 1996 welfare reform legislation is based on RON HASKINS, WORK OVER WELFARE:
THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 1996 WELFARE REFORM LAW (2006) [hereinafter HASKINS, WORK OVER
WELFARE].
28
R. KENT WEAVER, ENDING WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT 169–95 (2000).
26
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ignited by any major public figure who decided to make welfare an issue, as Republicans
often did approximately at election time. Second, the welfare reform legislation that was
enacted with much fanfare in 1988, which mostly broadened benefits and included
something like work suggestions rather than work requirements, was followed by a rapid
increase in the welfare rolls.29 Third, governors began experimenting with programs to
encourage and cajole welfare recipients into work, primarily by teaching them how to
look for work and then helping them plan for and participate in job interviews, a strategy
widely referred to as “job search.” In large and well-conducted demonstration programs
that included random-assignment evaluation designs, many of these programs were
shown to increase work, reduce welfare spending, and, in some cases, save government
money.30 The upshot was that many governors jumped on the welfare reform bandwagon
and began to agitate in Washington for more flexibility in running their welfare
programs. A fourth important factor was that Bill Clinton won the Democratic
nomination for President in part by campaigning on “ending welfare as we know it.”
Such a political slogan had never previously been heard from a Democrat. Once elected,
Clinton appointed a task force to write his welfare reform bill. After about a year of
deliberation, Clinton’s task force produced a bill, but then the President encountered
resistance from Democrats in Congress who were not willing to support the strong work
requirements Clinton wanted. So Clinton and the Democratic Congress agreed to delay
action until after the congressional elections of 1994.31
¶17
Bad mistake. For just when the Clinton effort to reform welfare appeared to be on
life support, Republicans won both houses of Congress in the 1994 elections,
considerably reducing Clinton’s ability to control congressional action on welfare reform.
Now the fifth factor that produced the 1996 reforms was in place. House Republicans
had been intent on reforming welfare for several years and had run their congressional
elections on a platform that included a radical welfare reform proposal, developed by a
small group of House Republicans appointed by the Republican leadership, that went
beyond anything even Clinton had contemplated.32 In retrospect, it seems fair to
conclude that Clinton started a welfare reform movement that eventually exploded out of
his control. In any case, Republicans passed their bill twice in 1995. Clinton vetoed both
because they were too radical.33 But Republicans passed a somewhat modified bill in
1996 and, with the presidential election approaching, half the Democrats in the House
and Senate supported the Republican bill and Clinton signed it into law.34
29

HASKINS, WORK OVER WELFARE, supra note 27, at 11–19.
See generally JUDITH M. GUERON & EDWARD PAULY, FROM WELFARE TO WORK (1991) (synthesizing
welfare reform experiments that took place in the states in the 1970s and 1980s before Congress enacted
the sweeping Welfare Reform Law of 1996 and showing, based on rigorous evaluations of programs in
twenty-one states involving over 65,000 people, that the reform programs increased the earnings of poor
families and saved money).
31
HASKINS, WORK OVER WELFARE, supra note 27, at 81.
32
For details on the development of this bill, see id. at 20–83.
33
Although opinions might differ, the bill President Clinton signed in August of 1996 was not very
different from the two bills he vetoed. All of the main features of the original bills were in the signed bill,
including the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block grant, the child care block grant, the
mandatory work requirements, the five-year time limit, the restrictions on welfare benefits for noncitizens,
the reductions in food stamp benefits, and many others. Perhaps the major change in the bill President
Clinton signed was that the reduction in the Earned Income Tax Credit was changed and only provisions
approved by the Clinton Administration were included in the signed bill. See id. at 314–31, 364–76.
34
Id. at 314–31.
30
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B. Provisions of the 1996 Law
¶18

The 1996 welfare reform law was the most sweeping social legislation since the
enactment of Medicaid and Medicare in 1965. The law deeply reformed child care,
Supplemental Security Income for both children and for drug addicts, child support
enforcement, and welfare for noncitizens.35 Any of these individual sets of reforms
would have constituted major changes in the nation’s social programs, but taken together
they made the 1996 law a blockbuster almost without precedent. But the reform that
commanded the most attention from scholars, reporters, and politicians was the repeal of
AFDC—a major New Deal program—and its replacement by the Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) program.
¶19
The heart of the TANF reforms can be captured in five major provisions.36 The
first was the end of entitlement. The AFDC program provided a guaranteed cash benefit
to anyone who met the qualifications, roughly meaning anyone who had a child and no
job. This legal right to cash welfare was repealed, leaving the way open for states to
make welfare benefits contingent on specific actions that could lead to employment.
Equally important was the symbolic value of the end of entitlement. Parents no longer
had a right to welfare; they had to earn it, primarily by working or preparing for work.
¶20
The second major feature of the new law was the creation of a cash welfare block
grant.37 Under AFDC, states provided benefits to qualified individuals and the federal
government paid half or more of the benefit. Thus, federal payments to states were
dependent on the size of the caseload—the higher the caseload, the more federal dollars
were given to the state. States that established programs to help welfare recipients work
and then leave the rolls lost federal dollars; states that expanded their caseloads received
more federal dollars. By contrast, under the block grant, states received a flat sum of
federal dollars (roughly equal to the amount they received in 1994 or 1995, whichever
was greater) no matter how many people were on the rolls, thereby giving them incentive
to develop programs to help recipients leave the rolls.
¶21
The third major feature of the new law was that states had to enroll half (after a
five-year phase-in) of their caseload in work programs, with the proviso that for every
percentage point by which they reduced their caseload relative to the size of their 1994
caseload, their fifty percent work requirement would be reduced by one percentage
point.38 The purpose of the work requirement was not only to ensure that individual
welfare recipients would have help finding work, but also to make sure that states
substantially revised their welfare programs so that the programs featured strong
components that helped and hassled most adults on the caseload to enter the workforce.
The aim was to change what might be considered the “culture of welfare” from a
35

For details, see id. at 364–76; WEAVER, supra note 28, at 316–41.
The statutory provisions of TANF are found in Part A of Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 601–608 (1997). The five provisions discussed in this section are found within Part A of Title IV as
follows: end of entitlement, § 601(b); block grant, § 603; work requirements, § 607; sanctions, § 607(e);
time limit, § 608(a)(7). These and the other provisions of the welfare reform legislation are outlined in
HASKINS, WORK OVER WELFARE, supra note 27, at 364–76; see also STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 104TH CONG., SUMMARY OF WELFARE REFORMS MADE BY PUBLIC LAW 104-193 (Comm. Print
1996) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF WELFARE REFORMS].
37
42 U.S.C. § 603.
38
For example, if a state reduced its caseload twenty percent below the 1995 level, the work requirement
would be fifty percent minus twenty percent, or thirty percent. See 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(3).
36
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program that primarily cut checks and ignored personal responsibility to a program that
tried to help people get back on their feet and achieve self-sufficiency through work.39
¶22
The fourth major tenet of the 1996 law required states to back up their work
requirements with a state-devised system for imposing sanctions on recipients who did
not meet the state work requirements.40 Under this provision, every state had to reduce
recipient cash benefits if the recipient did not prepare for work, search for work, or
actually work for a minimum number of hours. Although states were not required to
completely terminate welfare benefits for repeated violations of the work requirement,
eventually all but nine states designed a sanctioning system that called for termination of
benefits under some circumstances for some period of time.
¶23
Finally, one of the most controversial provisions of the legislation encouraged, but
did not require, states to terminate benefits after five years.41 This provision had two
major loopholes. The first was that, as drafted, the provision simply disallowed using
federal dollars for families that had been on the rolls for five years. Thus, states could
use their own money to pay for families the state wanted to stay on the rolls after five
years. In addition, the federal law allowed states to use federal dollars even after five
years for up to twenty percent of their caseload. Perhaps the most important function of
the five-year time limit was to signal—as the name of the new program implies—that
welfare is temporary.42
¶24
Taken together, these five features of the new law constituted radical change in an
important federal program that had been in force for over six decades. Nonetheless, the
legislation passed Congress on a huge bipartisan vote and was signed into law by a
Democratic president.
C. Work Support System
¶25

But welfare reform was only half the federal strategy for attacking poverty. Over
the period of more than a decade before the enactment of the 1996 reforms, Congress and
Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bill Clinton had passed a series of
laws that created, modified, or expanded programs that provided cash and in-kind
benefits to poor and low-income working families, mostly families with children.
Collectively, these programs are often referred to as the nation’s “work support system.”
In my view, the work support system is one of the most important ingredients in the
nation’s approach to social policy. The system is comprised of four essential programs
and several less vital, but still important programs.
39
See DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 3 (1988) (emphasizing the
check writing culture of welfare almost a decade before the welfare reform law of 1996); IRENE LURIE, AT
THE FRONT LINES OF THE WELFARE SYSTEM: A PERSPECTIVE ON THE DECLINE IN WELFARE CASELOADS 1
(2006) (directly observing welfare offices and finding that helping clients find work was the major
emphasis of the new welfare administration); RICHARD P. NATHAN & THOMAS L. GAIS, IMPLEMENTING THE
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1996: A FIRST LOOK 1 (1999) (finding that major changes have taken
place in the direction of emphasizing work, after reviewing the reforms in state programs about two years
after the 1996 law went into effect).
40
The Urban Institute maintains information about such sanctions. See The Urban Inst., Assessing the New
Federalism Project, http://anfdata.urban.org (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
41
42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7).
42
Richard P. Nathan, Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Am. Political Sci. Ass’n: Updating
Theories of American Federalism (Sept. 2, 2006).
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¶26

The most important program in the work support system is the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC), which provides cash payments through the tax code to boost the income
of low-income workers, especially those with children. The EITC, created in 1975, was
expanded in 1986 by Reagan, in 1990 by George H.W. Bush, and in 1993 by Clinton.43
By the time the welfare reform law passed in 1996, the EITC was the biggest program
providing cash to low-income families. Workers with children could receive a wage
supplement of up to $3600 (in 1996)—a little less than twice as much as a full time
worker at the minimum wage would receive if the minimum wage had been raised by $1
an hour (as in fact it was—from $4.25 to $5.15—in the year after welfare reform was
enacted).44
¶27
Similarly, in 1990, Congress passed and George H.W. Bush signed a law that
created a block grant for child care.45 Simultaneously, two new programs were created
under the AFDC program to help families pay for child care. The welfare reform law of
1996 combined all three child care programs and a few others into a child care block
grant and approximately doubled the funding over a period of years so that states would
have additional money to help families pay for child care.46
¶28
The food stamp program already helped millions of poor working families and
promised to provide an income supplement in the form of food credits to families that left
welfare. As in the past, food stamps declined in value as earnings increased, but a typical
mother with two children earning $10,000 per year qualified for about $1500 in food
stamps in 1996.47 For several years, states complained that it was administratively
difficult to provide working families with food stamps primarily because the states were
fined for making payment errors and the cases most likely to have errors were those of
working families.48 Thus, states were not aggressive in providing food stamps to
working families. In the 2002 farm bill, Congress changed several rules in the food
stamp program that made it easier to administer cases that involve working families.49
Since then, the rate of participation in food stamp programs by working families has
increased substantially.50
¶29
Two programs—Medicaid and the State Child Health Insurance Program
(SCHIP)—work together to provide health insurance to virtually all children from
43

Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 88, 89 Stat. 26 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 16, 19, 26, 29, 30, 47 U.S.C.).
44
Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 19, 26, 42 U.S.C.).
45
Child Care & Development Block Grant of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9858–9858g (2008); STAFF OF H. COMM.
ON WAYS & MEANS, 108th CONG., 2004 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 9-1 to 9-62 (Comm. Print 2004)
[hereinafter 2004 GREEN BOOK].
46
HASKINS, WORK OVER WELFARE, supra note 27, at 367–68.
47
2004 GREEN BOOK, supra note 45, at 15-16 to 15-18.
48
AMERICAN PUBLIC HUMAN SERVICES ASS’N, CROSSROADS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SOCIAL POLICY 45
(2001), available at http://www.aphsa.org/Publications/Doc/crossroads.pdf.
49
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7, 16, & 21 U.S.C.).
50
CAROLINA RATCLIFFE, SIGNE-MARY MCKERNAN & KENNETH FINEGOLD, THE URBAN INST., THE EFFECT
OF STATE FOOD STAMP AND TANF POLICIES ON FOOD STAMP PROGRAM PARTICIPATION 26 (2007),
available at http://www.urban.org/publications/411438.html.
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families earning under 200% of the federal poverty levels.51 Before the mid-1980s,
mothers who left welfare for work usually lost their Medicaid coverage.52 Especially
given the low rates of health insurance coverage provided by employers to low-wage
workers, the loss of Medicaid was a major issue for mothers. In fact, mothers could
make a rational decision to stay on welfare in order to ensure that their children had
health coverage. Beginning in the mid-1980s, primarily under the leadership of Henry
Waxman of the House Commerce Committee, Congress began the long process of
breaking the connection between welfare and Medicaid.53 By 1996, all children in
families under the poverty level and many children in families up to 185% of the poverty
level were eligible for Medicaid regardless of the status of their mothers.54 Then in 1997,
Congress enacted SCHIP and states were given funds to cover children in families up to
200% of the poverty level.55 Mothers who leave welfare are covered for up to one year,
but there are many poor working mothers who do not have health care coverage.
¶30
The EITC, child care, food stamps, and health insurance programs are generally
considered to be the major programs in the work support system.56 However, a host of
other programs, although not designed specifically to help low-income workers, have
eligibility standards, phase-out rates, or services that help low-income working families.
All the child nutrition programs (child care food program, school lunch and breakfast,
and the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children) as well
as the housing programs are chief among these programs.57 In addition, all mothers who
have custody of children with a living non-resident father are eligible for services from
the Child Support Enforcement program.58 However defined, the work support programs
are an indispensable tool for encouraging work by low-income adults and for helping
low-income workers increase their income and avoid poverty.
III. TRENDS IN WORK AND CHILD POVERTY IN THE WELFARE REFORM ERA
A. Trends in Enrolment, Work, Earnings, and Child Poverty
¶31

Most students of welfare reform and its effects emphasize that three factors, taken
together, are reasonable explanations for the changes in welfare rolls: work rates,
earnings, and child poverty that occurred among families headed by single mothers
beginning in the mid-1990s. These factors are the sticks of welfare reform, the carrots of
the work support system—especially the expansion of the EITC, and the hot economy of
the mid- and late-1990s.59
51

2004 GREEN BOOK, supra note 45, at 15-26 to 15-98.
ELLWOOD, supra note 39, at 175–76.
53
2004 GREEN BOOK, supra note 45, at 15-40.
54
Id. at 15-33 to 15-35.
55
Id. at 15-83 to 15-98.
56
See generally ROBERT P. STOKER & LAURA A. WILSON, WHEN WORK IS NOT ENOUGH: STATE AND
FEDERAL POLICIES TO SUPPORT NEEDY WORKERS (2006) (reviewing the development of the work support
system and its current functioning and concluding that the system has great potential but that problems in
implementation prevent it from helping as many low-income workers as it could).
57
2004 GREEN BOOK, supra note 45, at 15-98 to 15-118.
58
See generally id. at 8-1.
59
HASKINS, WORK OVER WELFARE, supra note 27, at 332–63. See generally JEFFREY GROGGER & LYNN A.
KAROLY, WELFARE REFORM: EFFECTS OF A DECADE OF CHANGE (2005) (studying the effects of Welfare
Reform on recipient’s behavior); Christopher Bollinger et al., Welfare Reform and the Level and
Composition of Income, in WELFARE REFORM AND ITS LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES FOR AMERICA’S POOR
52
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Figure 9
Percentage of Married, Single, and Never-Married Mothers Working, 1985-2005
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Certainly nothing like the decline in welfare rolls seen after this reform had ever
occurred before. In fact, in the three decades between the early 1960s and the early
1990s, the rolls increased almost every year, with two large spurts in the early 1970s and
the early 1990s.60 But since 1994, the rolls have declined every year, falling a total of
sixty percent over that period.61 This decline in the rolls was accompanied by a
substantial increase in the share of single mothers who worked. Figure 9 shows the share
of married, single, and never-married mothers who were employed each year between
1985 and 2005. The work rates of both single mothers and the subgroup of single
mothers who were never married increased dramatically beginning in the mid-1990s. In
fact, the work rates of never-married mothers increased about forty percent in the four
years between 1996 and 2000.

(James P. Ziliak ed.) (forthcoming 2009) (documenting the changes in income of single mothers postwelfare reform); Robert F. Schoeni & Rebecca M. Blank, What Has Welfare Reform Accomplished?
Impacts on Welfare Participation, Employment, Income, Poverty, and Family Structure 4 (RAND,
Working Paper No. DRU-2268, 2000), available at http://www.rand.org/labor/DRU/DRU2268.pdf
(concluding that welfare reform both increased family earnings and reduced public assistance
participation).
60
2004 GREEN BOOK, supra note 45, at 7-32.
61
HASKINS, WORK OVER WELFARE, supra note 27, at 334.
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Figure 10
Earnings and Welfare Income for the Bottom Two
Income Quintiles of Female-Headed Families, 1990-2006
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Source: Calculations by Richard Bavier with data from the U.S. Census Bureau.
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Given their rising work levels, it is not surprising that single mothers’ incomes
increased during this period, nor that the share of income accounted for by earnings
increased as well. Figure 10 traces the major components of income for mothers in the
bottom two income quintiles (with total income between $0 and about $25,300 in 2006).
After the mid-1990s, income from earnings plus the EITC increased every year—until
2001—while income from welfare declined. Even after the recession of 2001, as the
employment and earnings of female heads declined, earnings plus the EITC were still
more than ninety percent higher in 2006 than they had been in 1993 before the rise in
employment began.
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Figure 11
Poverty Rates for Black Children, Children in
Female-Headed Households, and All Children, 1974-2006
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¶34

Reducing welfare dependency, increasing employment of single mothers, and
reducing child poverty were three of the goals of welfare reform. If welfare dependency
declined and employment and earnings increased among female heads following welfare
reform, as we have seen that they did, trends in child poverty were likely to be affected.
Figure 11 shows that between the mid-1990s and the recession of 2001, overall child
poverty, poverty for children in female-headed families, and poverty among black
children declined substantially. The declines in poverty among children in femaleheaded families (twenty-eight percent) and in black families (thirty-five percent) were
especially steep.62 Indeed, both the rates for all children in female-headed families and
for black children reached their lowest level ever, and poverty among all children was
within one percentage point of its lowest level ever—a remarkable achievement given all
the demographic forces working simultaneously to drive up child poverty rates.
¶35
Two points about these declining poverty rates seem especially notable. The first is
that, as we have seen, if the nation is to make progress against child poverty, policies that
focus on female-headed families should be a major component of a national strategy both
because so many children live in female-headed families and because the poverty rate of
this family form is so high. That the poverty rate for children in female-headed families
declined so substantially seems reasonable because single mothers were the main target
of welfare reform and were also the group with the greatest increase in work rates and
62

The decline in poverty for both groups was calculated based on the peak rate in the early 1990s (1992 for
both blacks and female-headed families) and the lowest rate in either 2000 or 2001 (2000 for femaleheaded families and 2001 for blacks) before poverty started rising again following the recession of 2001.
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earnings. Second, the robust decline in poverty among black children is attributable in
part to the fact that such a high proportion of black children (around fifty percent) live in
female-headed families and that black women were no less likely to find work than white
women.63
B. Explaining the Trends
Figure 12
Support for Working Families Increased Dramatically between 1984 and 1999
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¶36

1999 Law
Spending in 1999 Under:

Primarily because we do not have data from random-assignment experiments, it is
inappropriate to conclude that welfare reform alone accounted for the trends reviewed
above. This is especially the case since so many other factors that could plausibly affect
the welfare rolls and employment by mothers formerly on welfare were also changing.
Figure 12, based on a report from the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office,64 shows
changes in the major programs that constitute the work support system. The figure shows
that if child care, SCHIP, the Child Tax Credit, Medicaid, and the EITC had not been
63

For data on the share of black children living with single mothers, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Household
Relationship and Living Arrangements of Children Under 18 Years, by Age, Sex, Race, Hispanic Origin, in
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY ANNUAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT TABLE C-2 (2006),
available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2006/tabC2-blackalone.xls. For data
on work rates for low-income black, white, and Hispanic mothers, see U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERV., INDICATORS OF WELFARE DEPENDENCE: ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2007) III-23, available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/indicators07/ch3.pdf.
64
See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, POLICY CHANGES AFFECTING MANDATORY SPENDING FOR LOWINCOME FAMILIES NOT RECEIVING CASH WELFARE (1998), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/8xx/doc849/noncash.pdf.
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created or expanded after 1984, in 1999 the nation would have spent just $5.6 billion
providing support through these programs to working families. But because all these
programs were originated or expanded between 1984 and 1999, $51.7 billion was spent
on working families. Politicians and the media often refer to the 1996 welfare reforms as
a revolution, but the difference between $5.6 billion and the $51.7 billion spent shows
that Congress and a series of presidents from both parties also created a revolution in
work support programs.
Figure 13
Poverty Rates for Children Living with
Unmarried Mothers Before and After Government Transfers
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1999
Year

And the two revolutions fit together. The analysis depicted in Figure 13, conducted
by the Department of Health and Human Services and the Congressional Budget Office,
provides a clear view of the impact of government programs on poverty rates of children
in families headed by unmarried mothers in 1990, before welfare reform, and in 1999,
after welfare reform. Compare the first bar graph in each set. These bars show the
poverty rate before any government tax or transfer programs—life in the state of nature,
so to speak.65 Here we see that the poverty rate in 1999 was over twenty percentage
points lower than in 1990 (fifty percent versus thirty-nine percent). Undoubtedly, this

65

There could be a slight impact of government programs on the poverty estimates before government
assistance. For example, mothers who had previously been in government education and training programs
could have jobs that pay better or the availability of the EITC could increase the likelihood that mothers
would work or work more hours. These effects, which are likely to be minor, would have been present
both in 1990 and 1999.
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decline in raw poverty before any government assistance was due to increased work and
earnings by these unmarried mothers as reviewed above.
¶38
Now consider the impact of government programs, beginning with spending
programs other than those administered through the tax code. In 1990, these programs
had a major impact on poverty, driving the rate down from fifty percent to thirty-seven
percent, a drop of over twenty-five percent. But despite the lower raw poverty rate in
1999, these same spending programs still managed to drive poverty down by nine
percentage points (from thirty-nine percent to thirty percent), or nearly twenty-five
percent. Now consider the child poverty rates after the effects of the EITC are taken into
account. In 1990, the EITC had virtually no impact on poverty, both because it was
much smaller in 1990 than in 1999 and because so few of these mothers worked in 1990.
But in 1999, the EITC drove child poverty down another five percentage points, or by
over fifteen percent.
¶39
It is often said that poverty programs are poor programs, but the story that lies
behind the data in Figure 13 is a rare and hopeful example of how government programs
can augment the efforts of individuals to produce an outcome that is high on the nation’s
agenda of social goals. The combination of more work by disadvantaged mothers and the
growth of government programs that reinforced their efforts while increasing their
income was associated with a poverty rate that was nearly a third lower than it had been
before welfare reform.
¶40
Stepping back to reflect on these trends, three lessons for social policy seem
apparent. The first, and most important, is that carrots and sticks work. Social policy
should emphasize—and where necessary and possible demand—responsible personal
behavior and then reward that behavior. Second, one of the major arguments against
welfare reform was that there were not enough jobs available in the American economy
to support a major movement of mothers into the job market.66 That concern was
misplaced as something on the order of 1.5 million additional mothers found jobs. Third,
the prediction that low-wage jobs would doom mothers and their children to a life of
poverty turned out to be questionable. There is no doubt that a full-time job, even at
minimum wage, when combined with income from the EITC, provides more income than
welfare alone, even in states like Connecticut and California with the highest welfare
benefits.67 But we know from numerous surveys that mothers leaving welfare on average
earned about eight or nine dollars an hour, well above the minimum wage.68 Moreover,
nearly all the mothers who went to work got the EITC and many also received up to
$1000 or even $1500 in food stamps. Both on paper and in practice (Figure 10), most
mothers who left welfare improved their financial condition.69

66

For an overview of the arguments used by scholars, politicians, and editorial page writers against welfare
reform, see HASKINS, WORK OVER WELFARE, supra note 27.
67
See generally NORMA B. COE, GREGORY ACS, ROBERT I. LERMAN & KEITH WATSON, THE URBAN INST.,
DOES WORK PAY? A SUMMARY OF WORK INCENTIVES UNDER TANF (1998), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/anf28.pdf (providing an overview of state welfare programs).
68
See, e.g., GREGORY ACS & PAMELA J. LOPREST, THE URBAN INST., TANF CASELOAD COMPOSITION AND
LEAVERS SYNTHESIS REPORT 29–30 (2007).
69
See Bollinger et. al, supra note 59; Robert A. Moffitt, The Effect of Pre-PRWORA Waivers on AFDC
Caseloads and Female Earnings, Income, and Labor Force Behavior, in ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND
WELFARE REFORM, 91, 91–118 (Sheldon Danzinger ed., 1999); Schoeni & Blank, supra note 59, at 8.
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IV. THERE IS A LOT LEFT TO DO
¶41

A problem with policymaking in the nation’s capital and many state capitals is the
highly partisan nature of the debate on welfare reform. In the battle to reauthorize the
national reform law between 2002 and 2005, for example, the debate focused primarily
on how high the welfare work requirements should be and as a result took a partisan turn
almost immediately. This fight over work requirements seemed to preempt the kind of
reasoned debate that would have been desirable. Four additional items should have been
high on the agenda, but either were not discussed at all or received too little (and too
partisan) discussion: maintaining or expanding the work support system; reducing
nonmarital births and increasing marriage rates; providing more help to floundering or
disconnected mothers; and addressing the problem of male non-work, crime, and
incarceration. All of these issues should attract careful attention from policymakers and
result in a new burst of innovation that would increase the personal responsibility of lowincome Americans and further reduce poverty.
A. Maintaining the Work Support System

¶42

Many members of Congress do not seem to be fully aware of the vital role played
by the work support system in providing incentives for unskilled and inexperienced
adults to enter the workforce and take low-wage jobs, in reducing the poverty rate, and
even in fighting the growing inequality in America.70 The work support system is a
national treasure and should be well tended by both federal and state policymakers. More
specifically, two important actions now seem appropriate.
¶43
The first stems from the fact that not all eligible working families receive all the
work support benefits for which they qualify.71 As we have seen, a good example of
actions Congress can take to improve effectiveness of the work support system is the
2002 food stamp reforms that streamlined state administration and led to increased food
stamp enrolment by working families.72 These reforms are an especially good model
because they were proposed by states, based on the experience state officials had in
trying to administer food stamps for working families, and were adopted by Congress and
the Bush Administration on a bipartisan basis. As this example suggests, Congress
should periodically review all programs in the work support system to ensure that eligible
families are actually receiving the benefits, and solicit advice from recipients, state
administrators, and researchers on improving the programs.
¶44
Second, low-income working families need more help paying for child care.
Although Congress greatly increased child care funds when welfare reform was enacted
in 1996, there have only been a few modest increases since then. There are many lowincome working families that do not receive help paying for child care and there are large
70
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inequities in the system because mothers leaving welfare are more likely to get a child
care subsidy than similar mothers who did not go on welfare. Other than this
conspicuous inequity, the child care block grant and the vouchers it funds seem to be
working well. The major problem is simply that states need more money to ensure that
more working families receive child care. Mark Greenberg of the Center for American
Progress has recently recommended increasing child care funding by twenty billion
dollars a year.73 Given the serious and growing problems with the federal deficit, twenty
billion dollars is too much to expect, but Congress should try to increase child care
funding by one or two billion dollars per year over two or three years and make sure that
states use all the money for child care.74 The recommendation of one or two billion
dollars is inherently subjective, but the amount should be small enough that it has a good
chance of being accepted by Congress but big enough to provide meaningful help to lowincome families trying to work.
B. Reducing Non-Marital Birth Rates and Increasing Marriage Rates
¶45

Evidence shows that the optimum family form for promoting child development is
the married-couple family.75 Unfortunately, the share of children—especially black
children—living with two parents has declined precipitously over the past four decades.76
It is regrettable that scholars and program innovators have produced so little information
about how to restore marriage rates. The knowledge base for increasing marriage rates
today is approximately equivalent to the knowledge base for reducing poverty when
President Johnson initiated the War on Poverty in 1964. To expand this knowledge base
and then expand on what seems to work, several propositions seem reasonable.
¶46
First, we should do more to reduce non-marital births. Along with the decline of
marriage, the entry of women into the paid labor-force, and the aging of the population,
the rise of non-marital births is one of the most important demographic events of our
time.77 For reasons that are not clear, in sharp contrast with the modest concern over
non-marital births among older women and declining marriage rates, the scholarly and
policy worlds have long tried to figure out why so many teens give birth outside of
marriage and how to do something about it. The consequences of teen births are serious
for both the teen mother and for her baby.78 Not the least of these consequences is that
having a baby outside marriage reduces the mother’s chances of eventually marrying.
73
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There is evidence that several types of programs that engage teens in constructive
activities and provide authoritative advice about abstinence and birth control can reduce
both pregnancy rates and non-marital births without increasing abortion rates. These
programs are reviewed in great detail by Douglas Kirby for the National Campaign to
Prevent Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy.79 The programs that have proven most effective
in reducing both pregnancy rates and sexually transmitted diseases among teens are based
on tested curriculums that emphasize, among other factors:





Focusing on specific goals that influence behaviors that help
achieve these goals (especially increasing abstinence and use of
condoms);
Changing factors that affect sexual behavior, such as knowledge of
perceived risks, attitudes, perceived norms about abstinence, and
goals for the future;
Involving youth in constructive activities with adults such as
mentoring and community service; and
Securing support from local authorities such as schools,
departments of health, and community-based organizations.

¶48

Congress should provide the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
with up to one billion dollars a year for five years to provide money to states, local school
districts, and other community-based organizations to implement tested programs shown
to reduce sexual activity and teen pregnancy rates. All funded programs should
emphasize either abstinence, or abstinence and condom use, and must agree to collect a
standard set of data to monitor outcomes. HHS should give priority to jurisdictions that
have high poverty rates. In addition, HHS should select several exemplary programs for
careful evaluation by third parties using random-assignment designs. These third parties
should then periodically report their findings to Congress and to the public.
¶49
Second, both the federal and state governments should experiment with ways to
increase marriage rates among couples who want to marry, especially low-income
couples. If the goals of the TANF program can be accepted as statements of national
policy, increasing marriage rates and the share of children in married-couple families is
already an official goal of federal policy.80 Critics often pose this goal as one of trying to
talk people into getting married. But research conducted on representative samples of
couples who have had a child outside of marriage—a group that is disproportionately
PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY, PLAYING CATCH UP: HOW CHILDREN BORN TO TEEN MOTHERS FARE 3 (2005)
(children born to teen mothers begin kindergarten with lower levels of school readiness). But see generally
FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, DESTINIES OF THE DISADVANTAGED: THE POLITICS OF TEEN CHILDBEARING
(2007) (summarizing results from the Baltimore Study of teens who gave birth in the mid-1960s and were
followed for nearly four decades by Furstenberg and his colleagues; presenting a strong and controversial
critique of many of the public policies that the nation has adopted to fight teen pregnancy).
79
See DOUGLAS KIRBY, NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY, EMERGING
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TRANSMITTED DISEASES (2007).
80
See SUMMARY OF WELFARE REFORMS, supra note 36, at 14 (noting that two of the four goals of TANF
contain explicit statements about marriage. Goal 2 is to “end the dependence of needy parents on
government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage” and Goal 4 is to “encourage the
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poor and minority—shows that half of them live together, a total of eighty percent say
they are in love, and ninety percent of those who live together say their chances of
marriage are “fifty-fifty or better.”81 If couples say they want to marry, why not fund
community-based agencies to help them move toward marriage and to acquire
relationship skills that research shows can increase marital satisfaction and reduce
divorce rates?82
¶50
Two actions that have already been taken to promote healthy marriage deserve
public recognition. The first is that the Bush administration used discretionary funds to
establish high-quality demonstration programs designed to build and strengthen
marriage.83 Some of the programs are designed for young unmarried couples who have
had a child together (and often cohabit),84 some for young couples who are already
married,85 and some to promote community-wide programs that use media to point out
the advantages of marriage for children, adults, and communities. Other programs are
designed to use churches and other non-profit organizations to promote and strengthen
marriage.86
¶51
Marriage education under the Bush programs is typically conducted in a setting
with four or five couples and involves instruction and discussion of topics shown by
research to be key issues in most marriages, such as communication, money
management, dispute settlement, child rearing, trust, family violence, and sexual
fidelity.87 The sessions often follow clearly specified lessons and activities from
curriculums developed for young couples, including curriculums that have been
developed specifically for low-income black and Hispanic couples.88 There are now a
host of random-assignment studies being conducted around the nation to determine
whether using this kind of program can increase marriage rates or reduce divorce rates.89
All the studies are also collecting information on child outcomes, including performance
on standardized tests and school performance to determine whether children benefit if
their parents participate in marriage education programs. The federal government should
continue these demonstration programs for at least another five years to determine
whether carefully implemented marriage education that includes family coordinators and
services impacts marriage rates, divorce rates, and children’s development.
81
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Second, the Bush administration also sponsored legislation that now provides $100
million a year for 5 years to support about 150 programs throughout the nation that aim to
support healthy marriage.90 Most of the programs are sponsored by community-based
organizations like churches and other groups that provide services to poor and lowincome families.91 At the moment, none of these programs are being evaluated by welldesigned studies. Someone with political sensibilities might notice that these programs
are creating a network of local organizations and individual advocates who could play a
role when the question of reauthorizing the $100 million program comes up in Congress
in 2009 or 2010.
¶53
Yet another way to increase the incentives for marriage is to reduce financial
penalties in both the tax code and in transfer programs for couples who marry. Congress
has already taken several actions to reduce tax penalties for married couples and has even
modified the EITC so that married couples get to keep more of their EITC as their
earnings rise.92 Careful research on a representative national sample by Gregory Acs and
Elaine Maag of the Urban Institute shows that for most cohabiting couples under 200% of
the poverty level, the major marriage penalties come from loss of benefits in transfer
programs rather than the EITC.93 Based on this research, the federal or state governments
should authorize demonstrations that study the effects of allowing low-income couples
who marry to retain their welfare benefits, especially TANF and food stamps, for a year
or two after marriage.
¶54
Finally, a less specific consideration than the proposals outlined above invokes a
message about American culture. Consider welfare reform. It is true that a large number
of federal and state statutory provisions were changed to produce both the sticks
represented by work requirements and time limits, and the carrots represented by child
care, health insurance, and wage subsidies for those who work. Many of these reforms
were supported by scientific demonstrations showing that they would increase work and
even save government money.94 But having visited many of the programs, both before
and after welfare reform, and having discussed the reforms with welfare recipients,
welfare administrators, politicians from both sides of the aisle at the federal and state
level, and with many scholars who study poverty and welfare, I would make the
subjective claim that during the 1990s something very near to a consensus was developed
on the need to increase personal responsibility and reduce welfare dependency among the
poor. When public figures—and in this regard President Clinton deserves great credit—
90
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are singing a common tune of personal responsibility and work, and when this music is
consistent with sharp changes in programs throughout the nation that are willingly and
skillfully implemented by agents of government, something that might be called cultural
change is afoot. The welfare reform movement changed the way many politicians,
welfare administrators, and welfare recipients themselves viewed both welfare and work.
Without similar broad changes in society reflecting the importance of education and
marriage to adults, children, and society, our progress against poverty will be limited and
the development of children—especially minority children—will suffer.
C. Floundering Mothers
¶55

One of the most difficult problems in formulating a welfare system is striking the
appropriate balance between requirements and risk. It has been realized almost since
western societies began providing welfare benefits to the destitute that the availability of
welfare reduces work effort.95 A review of empirical research as early as 1981 by
Sheldon Danziger, Robert Haveman, and Robert Plotnick found that welfare did reduce
work effort.96 The 1996 welfare law addressed the problem of welfare interfering with
work effort by subjecting welfare mothers to more risk than any previous legislation.
Specifically, by imposing sanctions on mothers who did not meet work requirements and
by stipulating a five-year time limit on benefit receipt, the legislation virtually guaranteed
that some mothers would lose their benefits. If mothers did not have cash from welfare
and yet found it difficult to work consistently, they and their children would face
destitution.
¶56
Rebecca Blank has examined the record on destitution associated with the 1996
reforms, perhaps more carefully than anyone else.97 Blank estimates that more than two
million single mothers have difficulty finding jobs or holding them and do not receive
cash welfare.98 Most of these mothers face multiple barriers to work including mild
disabilities, addictions, transportation problems, personality problems, or have more than
two children.99 Blank proposes a special program for these mothers that would allow
them to continue drawing cash welfare as long as they are attempting to prepare for
employment or are working toward removing one or more of their barriers to work.100
The program would be conducted by skilled caseworkers with small caseloads who
would be able to provide individualized counseling and would have access to a range of
services.101 It would make sense for the federal government to set aside perhaps one
billion dollars per year for the next five or six years to allow states to experiment with
95
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demonstration programs along the lines recommended by Blank. The federal government
should pay the full cost of random-assignment evaluations of these programs. Although
federal and state policymakers have not paid adequate attention to this difficult problem,
it is potentially a politically divisive issue that could be used by opponents of welfare
reform to argue that the law is leading to too much suffering and should be fundamentally
revised. Social problems that are ignored fester and can ultimately lead to overreaction.
D. Single Males and Fathers
¶57

Another problem that, if anything, was exacerbated by welfare reform, is that too
many young black males are dropping out of the labor force, fathering children outside
marriage that they do not support, and adopting a life of crime and incarceration. In
1965, the work rates of young black males was about seventy-five percent greater than
the work rate of young black females.102 But over the years the work rates of black males
fell while those of black females rose.103 By 2000, the work rates of black females
surpassed the work rates of black males.104 When welfare reform required mothers to
work, their work rates increased dramatically while the work rates of young black males
were stable or declining. That mothers had little trouble finding jobs suggests that job
availability does not explain the poor work rates of black males.
¶58
Not surprisingly, increased levels of unemployment by young males are associated
with rising crime rates. Census and survey data of prison populations indicate that of
males born between 1965 and 1969, three percent of whites and twenty percent of blacks
had been in prison by the time they reached their early thirties.105 This rate of
incarceration for blacks was nearly double the rate for blacks born in the late 1940s and
nearly seven times the rate for whites in the same age group.106 More amazing still, sixty
percent of black high school dropouts born in the 1960s spent time in prison.107
¶59
These spectacular trends reflect at least two underlying sets of causes. The first is
the unfair and unwise set of laws and institutions that are the immediate cause of high
incarceration rates. Mandatory sentences—especially for dealing drugs—have
contributed greatly to the massive buildup of black males in prison.108 A notable feature
of the federal drug law passed in 1986 (in response to the crack epidemic) is that it
imposed especially tough sentences on the sale of crack cocaine.109 First-time offenders
were to receive a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for selling just five grams
of crack and selling more resulted in longer mandatory minimum sentences.110 As a
result, many black males—who were disproportionately likely to sell crack (as opposed
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to powdered) cocaine—spent the critical years when they should have been in the job
market locked up in prison.
The second cause of high black incarceration rates is the high level of criminal
behavior by young blacks. Based on incarceration rates, it is clear that on a per-capita
basis blacks commit significantly more crimes than whites.111 For example, the 2005
homicide rate of 3.5 homicides per 100,000 whites as compared with 26.5 for blacks
gives an idea of the dramatic difference in crime rates between the two groups.112
As Orlando Patterson, a black sociologist at Harvard, wrote, the propensity of black
youths to commit crimes is due, in part, to the “catastrophic state of black family life.”113
Undoubtedly other factors, including discrimination, limited economic opportunities, and
problems in gender relations, are involved, but the lack of male influence in the home
contributes to all of these factors as well as directly to crime rates. In place of a strong
home life featuring limits enforced by fathers, Patterson holds that young black men have
created what he calls the “cool pose culture.”114 This culture functions “almost like a
drug,” compelling young black men to hang out on the street, dress sharply, make sexual
conquests, use drugs, and listen to hip-hop music with lyrics glorifying violence,
misogyny, drugs, and sex.115 How to break the hold of this culture, which Patterson
believes has about one-fifth of young black males in its grip, is one of the top issues for
both the black community and for policymakers at all levels of government.116
Three actions should be taken to address the extreme level of incarceration among
young black men. First, marriage should be promoted and extra-marital pregnancy
discouraged. There is now widespread agreement that being reared in female-headed
families is a major cause of criminal behavior by young blacks.117 Thus, the policies
proposed above to reduce extra-marital births and promote marriage, if successful, would
almost certainly reduce the number of young men who commit crimes.
Second, more should be learned about, and greater investments made, in prison
release programs. Given that well over 600,000 people are released from prison each
year, interest in helping men readjust to life outside prison has been increasing for several
years.118 Typical is a large-scale, random-assignment study of a well-known program
conducted by the Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO) in New York City. CEO
is one of the most experienced organizations in the nation at helping ex-felons find
employment.119 The current study is following about 1000 people who either received or
did not receive the CEO job-assistance program. Early results suggest that men who join
111
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programs aimed at assisting felons soon after they are released were “less likely to have
their parole revoked, to be convicted of a felony, and to be re-incarcerated.”120 States and
the federal Department of Justice should ensure that these programs continue to grow and
that new programs conform to the results of the numerous on-going evaluations.
¶64
The final action, and the most difficult for policymakers, will be to revise laws that
impose mandatory sentences on non-violent, first-time offenders. The law enforcement
system should concentrate on keeping young men who have committed nonviolent
crimes out of prison. The first step is to repeal laws that provide for harsh mandatory
sentences on those who sell crack cocaine and laws that provide harsher penalties for
selling crack than for selling powered cocaine. In addition, the discretion of judges in
imposing prison sentences should be restored. The Supreme Court, not exactly a bastion
of liberal thought in America, has recently taken significant steps in this direction. On
December 10, 2007, the Supreme Court issued two 7–2 decisions (Gall v. United
States121 and Kimbrough v. United States122) that provide some relief from the harsh
federal sentencing guidelines enacted in 1986.123 Both of these cases are consistent with
increasingly urgent recommendations made for several years by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission calling for reductions in penalties for the sale of crack cocaine.
V. CONCLUSION
¶65

A host of demographic and economic trends in the United States make it difficult
for the nation to make progress against poverty and income inequality. However,
government policies that raise work levels and provide public benefits to supplement
earnings have proven to be effective in fighting poverty among female-headed families.
But further progress seems unlikely unless more poor adults work, reduce the number of
children born outside of marriage, and marry at higher rates. Government should spend
additional funds to strengthen programs that provide cash and other benefits to low-wage
workers and expand cash subsidies for young male workers. It should also design and
test new programs for single mothers who encounter difficulty getting or holding a job,
encourage marriage, and test innovative programs that discourage extra-marital births,
especially among teens.
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